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42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983: AN EMERGING VEHICLE OF
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF FOR STATE PRISONERS
Primarily because of the federalism concept and doubt concerning judicial
competence in the area, federal courts have traditionally been reluctant to
intervene in the internal operation of state prisons' Prisons have been viewed
as components of the executive branch of government and, accordingly, the
doctrine of separation of powers has been invoked to refuse examination of
prisoners' complaints. 2 Concern has also been voiced that judicial scrutiny
of administrative decisions would not only hinder the ability of penal officials
to achieve prison goals but also unduly restrict their freedom of action
because of vexatious litigation. 3 Thus, few courts have considered conditions within penal institutions as a legal issue; and even the basest conditions
have often been dismissed as necessary concomitants of penal life.
Against this constricted background, 42 U.S.C. section 1983 has been
interpreted to provide a private federal remedy for state prisoners by enabling
courts to grant appropriate legal or equitable relief when federal rights are
denied by persons acting under color of state authority. In Monroe v. Pape4
the Supreme Court noted that section 1983 "is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal
one is invoked."' Thus, state prisoners can petition the federal courts directly
and avoid the delay of pursuing state remedies for post-conviction relief. The
rights of personal bodily security, access to courts, and freedom of religion
are the federal rights most often protected through this action.
Consistent with the Supreme Court's recent concern with individual
rights, lower federal courts now review under section 1983 an increasing
number of prisoners' complaints involving penal conditions. Many courts
now consider section 1983 a viable alternative to state remedies for postconviction relief and recognize an overriding need to preserve individual
rights, even in the prison setting. However, judicial receptivity to these
petitions remains mixed, as illustrated by one court's remarks: 6
Not unexpectedly to those having experience in the trial of criminal
cases, persons convicted of crimes and in custody of their jailers do
not look upon decisions concerning civil rights as a pronouncement of
principles for the redress of genuine grievances or wrongs, but rather
as a blackjack to be used indiscriminately, maliciously, and at will to
harass and annoy ....

1.

Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal To Review the

Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 504, 512 (1963).
2. Note, judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 9

WM. & MARY L. RPv. 178,
180 (1967).
3. Note, 42 U.S.C. §1983- Civil Remedy-Its Circumvention and Emasculation, 12
HOWARD L.J. 285 (1966).
4. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
5. Id. at 183.
6. Roberts v. Barbosa, 227 F. Supp. 20, 21 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
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42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983
NATURE OF THE AcTION

Section 1983 was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 7 which was intended to extend federal court protection to Negroes
deprived of civil rights by state officials.8 Congress feared that state courts
were too susceptible to local prejudices to protect Negroes' rights adequately;
since federal courts were more insulated from local influence, they were
considered more likely to adjudicate objectively. 9 The statute was remedial;
thus, according to normal rules of statutory construction, relief should be
freely granted and defenses narrowly construed.' 0 Incident to this remedial
purpose was an intended shift of power from state to federal courts to allow
12
more effective protection of federal rights." The statute reads:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be
subjected any citizen of the United States or other persons within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
The breadth of this statutory language has resulted in its application to a
wide variety of situations' 3 induding claims by state prisoners on account
of penitentiary conditions. Under section 1983, state prisoners can initiate
actions in federal district courts against employees of state prisons and
county jails.34 The relief afforded has included injunctions and money
damages, but not the release of inmates from the institutions.
Numerous court decisions have failed to qualify the expansive terms
of this section. The Supreme Court has held that it provides a remedy
against persons who misuse state power as well as against those acting in
accord with such authority. 15 Proof of specific intent has not been required
to sustain the action.' 6 Judicial construction of the term "State or Territory"
has reached prisons in the District of Columbia. 7 The interpretation of the
statute as nonexhaustive, not requiring compliance with all potential state
remedies before seeking federal relief, has been extended to administrative

7.

Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, §1; 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1983

(1964)).

8. Note, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Protection of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 839 (1964).
9.

10.
11.

Id. at 842.

Id. at 839.
Id.

12. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1964).
13. See generally Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v.
Pape, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1486 (1969).
14. Pennsylvania ex rel. Gatewood v. Hendrick, 368 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1966), cert.

denied, 386 U.S. 925 (1967).
15. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
16. 74 YALE LJ. 1462, 1464 n.10 (1965).
17. Dixon v. Duncan, 218 F. Supp. 157, 159 (E.D. Va. 1963).
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as well as judicial remedies.1 s United States district courts, which exercise
original jurisdiction in section 1983 actions, have required neither diversity
of citizenship nor any jurisdictional amount to proceed therein. 19 Although
the statute is silent as to the measure and types of damages allowable, the
federal common law of damages is controlling.2 Thus, even punitive damages
have been awarded.

2 1

However, the application of this section is not unlimited. For example,
when another federal statute specifies means of redress for deprivation of a
particular right, the section is not applicable.22 Moreover, states and municipal corporations are excluded from the definition of "persons,"'23 and federal
prisons and officials thereof are not subject to this provision because the
statute does not apply to persons acting under color of federal law.24 Despite
these limitations, the remedy has been criticized for further burdening
already congested federal dockets by inviting frivolous petitions. 25 Another
objection is that this action undermines prison administration and discipline
26
and discourages experiments and innovations.
SPECIFIC AREAS

OF APPLICATION

Prison Conduct and Discipline
Federal courts have examined certain facets of penal life on an ad hoc
basis rather than explicitly delineating which aspects of prison conduct and
discipline are subject to review. The results have not been uniform. Courts
are divided concerning whether complaints involving matters related to the
internal management of prisons should be recognized. 7 Actions involving
9
8
allegations of unwarranted physical punishment, modes of confinement,'

and racial discrimination 3 0 have generally been considered.
State prisoners' complaints of physical abuse are encompassed by section
1983 as deprivations of due process. 31 The due process clause incorporates
18. Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
19. Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954).
20. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965).
21. Id.
22. Note, supra note 8, at 843.
23. United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. Pennsylvania, 281 F. Supp. 175, 178 (E.D. Pa.
1968), aff'd, 413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1969).
24. Johnson v. District of S. Mo. Comm'rs, 258 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Mo. 1966), alT'd,
368 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1966); accord, Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1964).
25. Note, supra note 13, at 1493.
26. Note, supra note 2, at 191.
27. Compare Threatt v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 858 (W.D.N.C. 1963), with
Talley v. Stephens, 247 F .Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
28. Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
29. Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
30. Labat v. McKeithen, 243 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1965), afJ'd, 361 F.2d 757 (5th Cir.
1966).

31.

Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804, 807 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
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the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment 32 and
implies a right to personal bodily security. Courts generally restrict the
extent of the due process guarantee to protection from serious physical
injury3 3 however, applications of this standard vary.34 Although allegations
of beating are generally reviewable, 35 corporal punishment has not been
declared unconstitutional per se. 36 Utilization of an electrical shocking
apparatus, teeter board, and strapping on bare buttocks have been permanently enjoined3s A fourteenth amendment violation also occurs when prison
officials knowingly compel inmates to perform labor that is beyond their
strength, dangerous to their lives or health, or unduly painful.38 In attempting
to establish standards for permissible bodily punishment, one court has said
punishment must "not be excessive, inflicted as dispassionately as possible,
and by reasonable people, and . . . applied in reference to recognizable
standards whereby a convict may know what conduct on his part will cause
39
him to be whipped and how much punishment given conduct may produce."
Particular modes of confinement are scrutinized by courts, but relief is
granted only where cruel and unusual punishment is apparent. Inmates
placed in an isolation cell in a county jail and denied food, water, and toilet
paper for fifty-two hours were not considered by one court to have suffered
such punishment.4 0 A prisoner placed in isolation for twenty-seven hours in
a concrete floored cell with the temperature at forty degrees and denied
clothing, blankets, and a mattress has also been denied relief.4'
Relief in these cases would probably have been granted under definitions
of cruel and unusual punishment enunciated in Jordan v. Fitzharris,42 which
declared that punitive practices would not be allowed when intolerable to
fundamental fairness, greatly disproportionate to the offense for which imposed, more cruel than necessary to achieve legitimate penal aims, or of
such character as to shock the general conscience. 43 In Jordan the application
of these tests resulted in a permanent injunction against use of the strip
32. Id. at 814.
33. Bryant v. Harrelson, 187 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
34. Compare Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965), with Bryant v.
Harrelson, 187 F. Supp. 738 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
35. Brown v. Brown, 368 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 868 (1966).
36. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 689 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
37. Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that any use of the strap is permanently enjoined because such use
violates the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
38. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 687 (E.D. Ark. 1965).

89. Id. at 689.
40. Ruark v. Schooley, 211 F. Supp. 921, 923 (D. Colo. 1962). The court stated there
was no deprivation of any right existing under the Federal Constitution and laws.
41. Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877
(1967). Petitioner's complaint had originally been brought under 18 U.S.C. §241, the criminal
action comparable to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Noting that suit under §241 could only be brought
by the United States, the court, sua sponte, transformed the petition to an action under
§1983. Id. at 420.
42. 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).

43. Id. at 679.
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cell. 44 Plaintiff had been confined to a strip cell for twelve days and allowed
light and ventilation for only fifteen minutes daily. He was deprived of
clothing for the first eight days and no means of cleaning his body were
available to him for the entire period. His bathroom hole was flushed twice
per day by prison personnel outside his cell. 45
Section 1983 actions also extend the judicial concern for eliminating
racial discrimination in society to penal life. This is particularly appropriate
since the original purpose of this provision was to assure constitutional and
legal rights for Negroes. 41 In Lee v. Washington2,4 the Supreme Court voided
on fourteenth amendment grounds an Alabama statute requiring separation
of races in prisons and jails. This decision no doubt will lead to further
litigation involving racial matters in prisons. Prior to Lee, Negro inmates
were denied relief in actions alleging that the use of segregated line formations, cells, and dining areas violated their constitutional rights.48 Older
decisions such as Nicholas v. McGee- that refused to apply the rationale of
Brown v. Board of Education-° because the peculiar problems of penology
are not present in education are impliedly overruled by Lee. However, other
decisions based on this rationale may remain valid if problems sufficiently
peculiar to penology were involved. Prior decisions such as Labat v. McKeithen, which enjoined prison officials from preventing correspondence
between Negro inmates and white women,51 more accurately reflect the
reasoning in Lee and thus remain the law.
Cases involving more narrow factual issues have also turned on due
process grounds. Jurisdiction has been recognized, for example, to hear a
prisoner's complaint that deprivation of parole eligibility for one and one-half
years resulting from his defense against an unprovoked physical attack
violates due process.5 2 Additionally, the right to a fair trial is breached when
an inmate is compelled to attend his jury trial in prison uniform.5 No
44. Id. at 683. A strip cell is also referred to as a dry cell. In Jordan, petitioner's cell
measured six feet by eight feet, four inches, and had no furnishings except a toilet. It had
no interior source of light and was not cleaned by prison personnel during petitioner's
confinement. Id. at 676, 677.
45. Id. at 687. A recent decision that also permanently enjoined use of the strip cell
on the same rationale as Jordan is Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
46. Note, supra note 8, at 839.
47. 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
48. Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal. 1959), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 6
(1959).
49. Id.
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. 243 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1965).
52. United States ex rel. Hancock v. Pate, 223 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Ill. 1963). The court
stated that the warden's action invaded an area properly reserved to the Pardon and
Parole Board for decision. Id. at 205.
53. United States ex rel. Diamond v. Social Serv. Dep't, 263 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
The court said the right to a fair trial would not automatically be abridged if a prisoner
is tried in his prison clothes before a judge without a jury. The court recognized, however,
that a plaintiff could logically contend he had been deprived of his rights because he
realized that proceeding to trial without a jury was his only hope for an unbiased trial.
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violation arises from special restrictions on prisoners sentenced to death,
however, if the restrictions are reasonable. 54 Thus, placing such inmates in
solitary confinement, limiting their correspondence with outsiders, and
restricting their visiting privileges have been upheld.55
The court of appeals' decision in Adams v. Ellis,5 6 which sustained mail
censorship by prison officials, is often cited to justify refusal to consider
inmates' petitions under section 1983. The opinion stated that courts should
refrain from supervising treatment and discipline of prisoners and should
limit their actions to releasing illegally confined inmates. 57 However, Adams
did not involve section 1983 actions, 58 and nowhere in the opinion did the
court discuss the review of complaints involving prison conduct and discipline
based upon deprivations of civil rights. Moreover, it is noteworthy that
Adams recognized that a proper case might arise from unwarranted punishment or treatment,5 9 precisely the subject to which section 1983 is addressed.
Practice of Law by Prisoners
Reasonable access to courts is guaranteed to state prisoners by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 60 More specifically, a prisoner
has "the right . . . to prepare, serve, and file legal papers and prosecute
legal actions affecting his personal liberty."61 When inmates have challenged
the propriety of restrictions on their preparation of legal documents,62 courts
have generally upheld the restrictions if they did not foreclose all access to
the courts. 3 The most difficult problem is presented by regulations prohibiting "jailhouse lawyers" from preparing legal papers for their fellow
prisoners. In Johnson v. Avery,64 the Supreme Court held:65
[U]nless and until the State provides some reasonable alternative to
assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief,
it may not validly enforce a regulation . . .barring inmates from
furnishing such assistance to other prisoners.
54. Labat v. McKeithen, 243 F. Supp. 662, 665 (E.D. La. 1965).
55. Id. at 663.
56. 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952).
57. Id. at 485.
58. The statutes involved were 18 U.S.C. §1702 (1951), punishing obstruction of correspondence, and 18 U.S.C. §1708 (1951), punishing theft or receipt of stolen mail.
59. 197 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1952).
60. Hatfield v. Bailleux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
61. United States ex rel. Mayberry v. Prasse, 225 F. Supp. 752, 754 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
62. Bailleux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), rev'd Hatfield v. Bailleux, 290
F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
63. Hatfield v. Bailleux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 US. 862 (1961).
64. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
65. Id. at 490. This holding does not change Florida law because in Coonts v. Wainwright, 282 F. Supp. 893 (M.D. Fla. 1968), the court used the same reasoning and voided a
rule prohibiting inmates from helping other prisoners in preparing writs at a Florida road
prison. In affirming Coonts, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that even though
the voided Florida regulation allowed inmates to help illiterate prisoners prepare legal
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The Court noted that such a regulation would, in effect, deprive poorly
educated or illiterate prisoners of all access to courts. 66 Johnson speaks only
of the importance of allowing prisoners to prepare writs of habeas corpus
and does not mention petitions under section 1983. However, such petitions
are clearly within the scope of "petitions for post-conviction relief."1;7
Arguably, the free flow of habeas corpus writs, which allege illegal confinement, are more important than 1983 actions, where the authors are legally
imprisoned but under allegedly unlawful conditions. However, this distinction actually lacks substance, since either petition alleges unlawful treatment
that cannot conscionably be permitted. Johnson approved, as reasonable
regulations, restrictions on the time and location of preparing papers and
punishments for giving or receiving consideration for performing such
activities.18 The greatest difficulty for lower federal courts attempting to
follow Johnson will be interpreting the reasonableness of restraints. Penal
regulations should be closely scrutinized to prevent denial of access to the
courts by apparently reasonable, but in fact very broad regulations.
Bailleux v. Holmes"9 illustrates the most liberal approach yet taken on
the right of prisoners to prepare legal documents. The court enjoined enforcement of various prison regulations that prohibited inmates from studying law; preparing legal documents in cells; or receiving treatises, statutes,
and copies of cases from outside sources. 0 The practice of confiscating and
retaining as contraband prisoners' legal documents found outside the prison
library was forbidden by the court, 71 and persons in isolation were afforded
the right to initiate court action and communicate with counsel.72 On appeal,
however, this decision was overruled.' 3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that judicial inquiry should be limited to whether the purpose of the
restrictions was to obstruct reasonable access to courts and, if so, whether the
practices and regulations actually interfered with such access. 74 Under this
standard the regulations were held to be acceptable.
Many courts affirm rules limiting or forbidding activities of jailhouse
lawyers because such conduct is viewed as illegal practice of law.75 Other
papers, literate inmates of low intelligence or poorly educated were still prevented from
effectively petitioning courts. 409 F.2d 1337, 1338 (5th Cir. 1969).
66. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969). In a survey taken by the Duke Law
Journal, the following statistics were compiled on inmates in Florida prisons: 48% completed less than 9 years of education, 25% had I.Q. of less than 80, and 1.2% were mentally
disabled. Note, Constitutional Law: Prison "No-Assistance" Regulations and the Jailhouse
Lawyer, 1968 DUKE L.J. 343, 359 (1968).

67. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 484 (1969).
68. Id. at 487.
69. 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), rev'd, Hatfield v. Bailleux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
70. Id. at 363, 364. The regulations did permit inmates to receive copies of cases from

publishers.
71. Id. at 364.
72. Id. at 365.
73.

Hatfield v. Bailleux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).

74. Id. at 640.
75.

25 WASH.& LEE. L. REV. 281, 286 (1968).
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tribunals reach -the same result by acceding to arguments by prison officials
that this activity fosters attitudes detrimental to rehabilitation.7 6 Some
administrators attribute increased inmate criticism of the institution, formation of an inmate hierarchy that exploits those of lesser intelligence, and
encouragement of false hopes of release to the activities of "jailhouse
lawyers."77
Protecting the public from the practice of law by unlearned and unskilled
persons is more important outside the prison. Within penal institutions jailhouse lawyers are often the only counsel available to indigent or illiterate
inmates. 78 The fact -that few inmates can afford customary legal fees for preparing and filing petitions provides a compelling reason for allowing jailhouse
lawyers. To the prisoners, reasonable access to courts would be a hollow
right without the legal assistance of fellow inmates, for to deny them this
aid would, in effect, deprive them of reasonable access to the courts. Courts
should balance the need for jailhouse lawyers against the need to prevent
the formation of attitudes detrimental to penal systems and the need to
discourage inmates from preparing baseless petitions that aggravate already
overcrowded dockets. However, in no case should judicial approval be given
to regulations that deny any prisoner reasonable access to the courts.
Medical Treatment
Judicial inquiry relating to prison medical treatment has been extremely
limited, with courts recognizing wide discretion in prison officials. Prisoners'
1983 petitions that have alleged deprivation of the right to personal bodily
security have usually been denied,7 9 and allegations of improper s and
inadequate"' medical care have been dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Talley v. Stephens,8 2 which merely
requires states to provide reasonable medical attention, exemplifies the
limited inquiry by the majority of courts.
Religious Beliefs
Freedom of religion, encompassing two distinct concepts - freedom to
believe and freedom to practice one's beliefs - is universally recognized as
a right possessed by prisoners.8 3 Penal limitations on the freedom to practice
one's religion have been challenged under section 1983 by prisoners who are
76. Note, supra note 66, at 345.
77. Id. at 345, 346.
78. Id. at 355.
79. E.g., Threatt v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 858 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
80. United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. Pennsylvania, 281 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Pa. 1968),
afJ'd,413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1969).
81. Medlock v. Burke, 285 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
82. 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
83. See Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 1 13UFFALO L, RYV. 397,

419 (1965).
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Black Muslims. 8 4 These petitions create great difficulty for the courts because

the replies of prison officials usually present very cogent reasons for the
restrictions.8 5 The following discussion will focus solely on allegations by
Black Muslim prisoners that penal authorities deprive them of freedom of
religion.
The Supreme Court held in Cooper v. Patel6 that Black Muslims could
not be denied religious privileges solely on the basis of their religious
beliefs when those prerogatives had been extended to prisoners of other
religions.17 The Court's terse opinion did not consider whether such privileges could be withdrawn if prison order and discipline were threatened. A
lower federal court has upheld a regulation that barred certain Muslim
publications because of their inflammatory nature. 88 However, the court
cautioned prison officials that such exclusion would not be tolerated if based
on religious discrimination or racial prejudice.8 9 Another decision utilized
a similar rationale in upholding a rule that prohibited Muslims from gathering for religious services in groups of larger than six. °
Prison authorities attempt to justify restrictions on Black Muslims'
religious practices primarily on two grounds. 91 First, doctrines of this religion
are said to be inflammatory, thus inciting violence and threatening penal
order; and second, Muslims are viewed as actually a social and political
group rather than a religious movement. The Supreme Court's decision in
Cooper expressly denies the latter objection by clearly extending the first
92
amendment protection of religious freedom to Black Muslim prisoners.
Until the Court considers the former ground, lower tribunals will continue
to weigh the interests involved, utilizing a reasonableness standard that to
date has favored penal officials.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS RETAINED

Although section 1983 prohibits deprivation of federal statutory rights
and constitutional interests, courts generally grant relief to prisoners only
for denials of the latter. Apparently because of the traditional reluctance
to intervene in the internal operations of prisons, courts are unwilling to
grant petitions alleging deprivations of prisoners' rights except in the most
demanding circumstances, such as obstruction of constitutional guarantees.
Moreover, there is general agreement that the constitutional rights of pris-

84. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L.
REV. 277, 303 (1965).
85. E.g., Jones v. Willingham, 248 F. Supp. 791 (D. Kan. 1965).
86. 378 U.S. 546 (1968).
87. Id.
88. Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1968).
89. Id. at 779.
90. Lee v. Crouse, 284 F. Supp. 541 (D. Kan. 1967), aff'd, 396 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1968).
91.

Note, Black Muslim Prisoners and Religious Discrimination: The Developing CriGEO. WASH. L. REv. 1124, 1128 (1964).

teria for JudicialReview, 32
92. 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
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oners are not as viable as those of ordinary citizens. Thus, the courts have
been forced to determine which constitutional rights are forfeited by inmates
and to what degree retained rights are curtailed.
To date, the judicial response may be separated into three increasingly
active phases. The early twentieth century attitude was that prisoners
were slaves of the state and, as such, completely lost most of their constitutional freedoms. 93 A slight change in this approach was evident in the
Supreme Court's opinion in Price v. Johnston.94 "Lawful incarceration
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying ouf penal system." 95 The tone of this remark suggests a departure from the view that
inmates are slaves. Recent decisions of lower federal courts indicate that
prisoners are increasingly afforded constitutional freedoms. These decisions
hold that prisoners retain all the rights afforded ordinary citizens except
those denied expressly or through necessary implication of law. 96
The apparent trend of federal court decisions is toward allowing prisoners
to exercise more constitutional freedoms. Unfortunately, however, a definitive, comprehensive, and detailed statement of prisoners' constitutional rights
has not yet been provided. The absence of such a declaration forces inmates
to continue the unsatisfactory procedure of seeking constitutional protections
on a case-by-case basis. Until such a statement is presented, courts should
insure that persons entering prison forfeit constitutional guarantees only to
the degree absolutely necessary for effective penal administration. Consistent
with the philosophical shift in modem penology to rehabilitation and correction, such an approach will better prepare inmates to return to society.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has protected students, a group that must
also function in a disciplined environment, from suppression of rights by
school officials absent a finding of material and substantial interference with
appropriate discipline.97 Undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disruption
is not sufficient to justify oppressive actions on the part of school officials. 98
A standard of reasonableness for construing school regulations has been rejected because such a standard might not adequately protect students' constitutional rights. However, many prisoners' petitions alleging deprivation
of constitutional rights by penal restrictions are rejected on the basis of a
reasonableness test. Courts should be cognizant that the reasonableness
standard will sanction unwarranted constitutional deprivations in the prison
setting just as it does in educational institutions.
93. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871), said: "He [the convicted felon] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his
personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the
time being the slave of the State."

94. 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
95. Id. at 285.
96. See, e.g., Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S.

887 (1945).
97. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
98. Id. at 508.
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OF FEDERALISM

Federal court intervention in the administration of state prisons continually evokes protests by states claiming federal encroachment on state powers.
Problems arise from public misunderstanding of state policies, potentially
unfavorable disclosures concerning the operation of state prisons, and state
officials' reluctance to allow federal investigations.9- State claims to exclusive
jurisdiction over their prisons and immunity of state officials from federal
prosecution have been expressly rejected.100 State laws that deny remedies
available under section 1983 are voided by the preemption doctrine.' 0' Federal
courts, however, cannot grant relief until a person acting under state authority
deprives a prisoner of his federal rights.
There is a valid state interest in maintaining control of state prisons,
and there is some merit in the contention that variance in prison problems
among the states necessitates local control, including local judicial review.
Nevertheless, courts that are petitioned to review state prisoners' complaints
under section 1983 cannot overlook the intent of Congress that federal courts
protect federal rights. Federal courts are more likely to construe complaints
objectively because they are detached from state pressures and influences. In
any case an individual should not suffer deprivation of his rights while courts
concern themselves with jurisdictional niceties.
FEDERAL HABEAS

CORPUS

AND FLORIDA'S MOTION

To

VACATE,

CORRECT,

OR

SET ASIDE SENTENCE

In federal courts, the primary means of obtaining post-conviction relief is
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Enacted in response to Gideon v.
Wainwright,102 the motion to vacate, correct, or set aside sentence 0 3 has

been utilized in Florida to seek post-conviction relief. The development of
section 1983 for use by state prisoners not only complements these remedies
but also adds a new dimension to them. A comparison of section 1983 with
each of the other two remedies reveals that the civil rights statute is superior
for use by prisoners who are legally confined, but under unlawful conditions.
Two aspects of federal habeas corpus support the conclusion that its use
for prisoner complaints is often less adequate than the use of section 1983.
99. Caldwell & Brodie, Enforcement of the Criminal Civil Rights Statute, 18 U.S.C.
§242, in Prison Brutality Cases, 52 GEo. L.J. 706, 719 (1964). The authors report that in
1953, Florida's policy was to disallow inmate interviews by Federal Bureau of Investigation
agents at the Florida State Road Department Prison Camp unless state representatives were
present during the interviews.
100. United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1953). The court overruled the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, which had held that the
legality of whipping or corporal punishment in state penal institutions was purely a matter
of state law. 108 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
101. See Page, State Law and the Damages Remedy Under the Civil Rights Act: Some
Problems in Federalism, 43 DENVER L.J. 480, 489 (1966).
102. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
103.

FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.850.
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First, the scope of habeas corpus is usually limited to release of persons who
are illegally confined. Habeas corpus is thus inappropriate for petitions
seeking permanent injunction of prison conditions or damages from penal
04
officials. The few courts that have granted injunctive relief under this writ
remain a definite minority. Expanding the scope of habeas corpus may enable
courts to protect prisoners' rights effectively, but this fictionalized extension
is unnecessary in light of the breadth of section 1983. Moreover, habeas
corpus petitioners are generally required to exhaust state remedies before
seeking the writ. 05 Since section 1983 does not require this time-consuming
process, 108 use of this statute accelerates access to federal courts. Section 1983
thus provides a better remedy than habeas corpus for prisoners who are
legally confined.
In Florida, the motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence is severely
criticized because it requires prisoners to seek relief from the same court
that allegedly committed error. 07 If an inmate challenges his sentence on
the grounds that it was imposed contrary to federal law or the Constitution,
he can avoid possible bias in trial court review by petitioning the federal
court under section 1983.
Under section 1983 a Florida prisoner may challenge the constitutionality
of requiring utilization of the motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence.
An inmate might argue that the motion abridges his constitutional right to
procedural due process because review in the trial court deprives him of
the right to be adjudged by an impartial trier of fact. In Roy v. Wainwright,08 the Florida supreme court affirmed the constitutionality of the
motion and noted that it was identical to a federal statute that had been
consistently upheld by federal courts. 09 Most of the federal decisions concerned constitutional challenges to the federal enactment on the grounds of
104. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), represents the most expansive
view of habeas corpus to date. The court said the writ should issue when a prisoner "is
deprived of some right to which he is lawfully entitled even in his confinement, the deprivation of which serves to make his imprisonment more burdensome than the law allows or
curtails his liberty to a greater extent than the law permits." Id. at 445. The court explicitly
stated that habeas corpus should not be limited to a mere remand or discharge of the
inmate. Id.
105. Bruce v. Beto, 396 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1968), holds that exhaustion is not required
for habeas corpus in the limited instance where demanding it would be a futile act.
106. Monroe v. Pape, 865 U.S. 165, 183 (1961).
107. Brown, Collateral Post-Conviction Remedies in Florida, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 806,
325-29 (1968); Clark, Curable Ills of the Criminal Law of Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. Rv. 258,
298-99 (1963). Brown recommends that in all cases: "The senior judge of the circuit shall
assign consideration of the motion to any trial judge of the court which imposed the sentence
or to any trial judge of a higher court within the county having criminal jurisdiction; provided however that in no case shall the judge who imposed the sentence receive the assign-

ment unless the sentence was imposed by a circuit court in a circuit having only one circuit
judge." 20 U. FLA. L. RFv. 306, 326 (1968). Clark's suggestion differs in two respects: he
would retain the present procedure in misdemeanor cases and in no instance would he
allow the judge who imposed the sentence to review the motion.
108. 151 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1963).
109. Id. at 828. The federal statute referred to is 28 U.S.C. §2255 (1959).
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double jeopardy or suspension of habeas corpus." 0 Thus, challenges to the
motion on the ground of procedural due process are not foreclosed.
ORGANIZED

LEGAL

SERVICES

As a practical matter, the continued development of section 1983 as a
vehicle for post-conviction relief depends upon institutionalized legal services
for prisoners, since few prisoners can finance conventional legal action. One
suggestion has been to develop, within state public defender offices, a staff
of attorneys to represent inmates in appeal and review proceedings."' By
eliminating jailhouse lawyers, such a program might substantially reduce the
2
number of frivolous appeals."
In Florida, a proposal that deserves serious consideration is extending
criminal rule 1.860 to allow students participating in public defender and
legal aid programs to furnish legal services to prisoners."13 This suggestion
is attractive because it does not necessitate additional costs in the public
defender program. This solution would also benefit courts by allowing them
to hold inmates who institute actions, against the advice of law students,
more susceptible to summary dismissal and contempt powers. 14 The Law
Student Prison Research Council at the University of Pennsylvania could
serve as a model. Since the summer of 1966 this organization has handled
over 1,300 requests from prisoners in twenty-nine states. 1 5 The council
receives an average of five letters per day from the Florida State Prison at
Raiford.116 In addition to furnishing an otherwise unavailable service to
prisoners, the work has been a valuable educational experience for the
students." 7
CONCLUSION

Section 1983 is emerging as an important vehicle for post-conviction relief
for state prisoners. The breadth of the statute's language and the limited
number of prerequisites for invoking it result in its application in a variety
of situations. Although problems of federalism are diminishing, courts have
not yet produced a standard for determining allowable restrictions on the
constitutional rights of prisoners. Section 1983 is a more attractive action
than federal habeas corpus or, in Florida, the motion to vacate, correct, or
set aside sentence. Although courts have not as yet expanded the enactment
110. See 28 U.S.C.A. §2255 n.1 (1959).
111. Note, supra note 66, at 359.
112. Id.
113. Note, Trial Court and Prison Perspectives on the
Relief Process in Florida,21 U. FL4. L. Rav. 503, 514 n.64 (1969).

Collateral Post

Conviction

114. Id. at 515.
115. Letter from James N. Bryant, Chairman of the Law Students Prison Research
Council at the University of Pennsylvania, to Frank E. Maloney, Dean of the University of
Florida College of Law, Sept. 16, 1969.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
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